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MAX HALLER and MARKUS HADLER
HOW  SOCIAL RELATIONS A N D  STRUCTURES CAN 
PR O D U C E HAPPINESS A N D  UNHAPPINESS: A N  
IN TER N A TIO N A L COM PARATIVE ANALYSIS
(Accepted 15 November 2004)
ABSTRACT. In this paper, subjective well being, as measured by survey questions 
on happiness and life satisfaction, is investigated from a sociological-comparative 
point of view. The central thesis is that happiness and satisfaction must be under­
stood as the outcome of an interaction process between individual characteristics and 
aspirations on the one side, and social relations and macrosocial structures on the 
other side. A distinction is made between life satisfaction and happiness; the former 
is more seen as the outcome of an evaluation process including material and social 
aspirations and achievements, the latter as an outcome of positive experiences, 
particularly close personal relationships. The focus of this paper is on micro- and 
macrosocial conditions favouring or inhibiting the emergence of happiness and 
satisfaction. It is hypothesized that dense and good basic social relations, occupa­
tional involvement and success, sociocultural (religious and altruistic) orientations 
and participation are conducive to happiness and life satisfaction; the same should be 
true at the macrolevel for economic prosperity, relatively equal social structures, a 
well-established welfare state and political democracy. The latter conditions, how­
ever, should be more important for life satisfaction than for happiness. A compar­
ative, multilevel regression analysis of happiness in 41 nations around the world is 
carried out (using the World Value Survey 1995-1997). Both our general assumption 
and most of the specific hypotheses could be confirmed. It turned very clearly that 
“happiness” and “life satisfaction” are two different concepts. It could be shown that 
microsocial embedding and sociocultural integration of a person are highly relevant 
for happiness. However, contrary to earlier studies, we find that macrosocial factors 
like the economic wealth of nation, the distribution of income, the extent of the 
welfare state and political freedom are also relevant, particularly for satisfaction. 
W hat counts most is the ability to cope with life, including subjective health and 
financial satisfaction, close social relations, and the economic perspectives for 
improvement in the future, both at the level of the individual and at that of the 
society. These abilities are certainly improved by favourable macrosocial conditions 
and institutions, such as a more equal income distribution, political democracy and a 
welfare state.
KEY WORDS: happiness, international comparison, life satisfication, social in­
stitutions, social structure, social structure and happiness
170 MAX HALLER AND MARKUS HADLER
INTRODUCTION
How to attain happiness has been a central topic and preoccupation 
of philosophers and other writers from antiquity to the birth of the 
modern age (Bellebaum, 1992). Since then, however, a paradoxical 
bifurcation can be observed. On the one side, it is taken for granted 
that happiness is a fundamental goal, and even right of any indi­
vidual. The paradigmatic expression of this view has been given in 
the Declaration of Independence, adopted by the Congress of the 
United States in 1776: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are .. .  endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happi­
ness.” In recent times, happiness has become a topic investigated 
intensively by scientists from many disciplines. On the other side, 
happiness was no central topic for some of the founders of socio­
logical thinking around 1900 (Bellebaum and Barheier, 1997). Even 
in present-day general and sociological encyclopedias, the entry 
“happiness” seldom does appear.
One reason for the remarkable divergence between the decreased 
interest in happiness of sociological authors on the one side, and 
the rising interest of the other social sciences and the public may be 
the fact that a fundamental change was going on in the thinking 
about the ways how to attain happiness. For thinkers from Aris­
totle up to the early modern age, individual happiness was closely 
connected with the social order: It arises out of the free affirmation 
of an ordered social world (Pie, 1997). With the breakdown of a 
binding common value system, with secularisation, rationalisation 
and individualisation processes, happiness more and more comes to 
be seen as an idiosyncratic goal to be attained in specific ways by 
each individual. Modem societies have institutionalised two de­
fenses against the loss of secure social bonds: the myth of indi­
vidualism, and the denial of complexity in human affairs (Scheff, 
1990: 12).
The American philosopher Haybron (2003: 314-317) recently has 
given four convincing reasons why the social sciences should care 
about happiness: (1) we often appeal to considerations of happiness 
when deliberating about important decisions in life (Will I become 
happy with this partner? With this occupation?); (2) we assess our 
own situation or that of close persons often in terms of happiness
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(Are my children happy?); (3) happiness leads to clear predictions of 
behaviour1 (Happier people are more funny as companions in work 
and leisure.); (4) happiness is useful for the explanation of behav­
iour (Somebody may avoid to take a decision because he/she is 
unhappy).
The basic assumption of this paper is that the classical theories of 
happiness were fully right in their assumption that individual hap­
piness is contingent upon (while certainly not fully determined by) the 
social order. We start from the thesis that happiness must be seen as 
the outcome of an interaction process between individual aspirations 
and expectations on the one side, and more or less favourable micro 
and macrosocial conditions on the other side. In this paper, we try to 
explore more deeply the micro and macrosocial antecedents of hap­
piness from a sociological perspective. (In a twin paper, we focus on 
the individual side of happiness; see Haller and Hadler, 2004.) In the 
first section, we look at some present-day explanations of happiness 
from this point of view, arguing that they consider only the individual 
or the context side of happiness. Then we sketch our own approach 
and develop some concrete hypotheses focussing upon the micro and 
macro social context. In the next section, the data sets, variables and 
methods used are described. In the third and main part of the paper, 
the empirical findings are presented, using a multilevel regression 
analysis. We conclude with some considerations about the limits of 
our analysis and possibilities for its supplementation by further 
research.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Happiness has been investigated by researchers from many different 
social scientific disciplines and with diverging theoretical orientations. 
Let us have a short look on some of these approaches, before pre­
senting our own theses.
A Short Review and Critique o f Existing Theoretical Approaches
Here, we sketch out five different approaches to the explanation of 
happiness and try to give a short evaluation and critique of them 
from the viewpoint of our own approach.
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(1) Happiness as a stable trait o f individuals. Some psychologists 
maintain that happiness is a stable trait of individuals and an 
enduring characteristic of their personality (see also Doyle and Youn, 
2000; Frey and Stutzer, 2002: 10-12). Some of them argue that these 
traits exist since birth, based on neurophysiological structures which 
make some individuals prone to develop an optimistic and positive, 
and other individuals a more pessimistic and depressive outlook on 
life. Others argue that these basic tendencies are acquired in child­
hood, but then remain rather stable throughout life. Empirical re­
search has proved that happiness varies significantly with personality 
factors such as extraversión and neuroticism (Heady et al., 1984; 
Vitterso and Nilsen, 2002), or with personality types derived from 
psychoanalytic theory (Doyle and Youn, 2000). Yet, personality 
alone cannot explain happiness. It has been shown that happiness 
varies considerably over a longer time (Veenhoven, 1994), may- be 
even within a year (Schulz et al., 1988: 172). It varies in connection 
with important transition phases of the life cycle (leaving school, 
entering marriage, etc.) and decreases strongly during dramatic life 
events (serious illnesses, death of a close relative). When asked di­
rectly, people themselves remember life phases with very different 
levels of happiness. Even if fixed personality and genetic factors may 
determine 50% in the variation of happiness (as claimed by Lykken 
and Tellegen; see Myers, 2000), there must exist important other 
variables determining of happiness.
(2) Happiness as a consequence o f the objective life situation. An 
alternative approach assumes that happiness is conditioned by the 
objective life circumstances of people. Marx stated in his early 
philosophical writings -  against idealistic philosophers -  that the 
objective material conditions determine the fate of men but not their 
ideas or values. Today, income is the main indicator for material well 
being. Many economists take it “as a matter of course that higher 
income leads to higher happiness.” (Frey and Stutzer, 2002: 73). A 
higher income expands the opportunities of individuals since they can 
consume ever more goods and services. Also this position, however, is 
challenged by empirical research and on theoretical grounds (Fuentes 
and Rojas, 2001: 29Iff.). Many studies have shown that the rela­
tionship between objective and subjective levels of welfare is often 
weak or inexistent. Theories which assume a more or less direct 
connection between objective welfare and subjective happiness do not
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spell out the processes by which such a connection should come 
about. Scitovsky (1976: 59ff.) has made a distinction between feelings 
of comfort and experiences of pleasure. A high level of wealth pro­
duces comfort and feelings of satiation but often may prevent the 
pleasures that result from the experience of new challenges and 
experiences, or even inspiring dangers. The philosopher Nozick 
(1989) quotes his predecessor John Locke with the sentence: “It is 
better to be an unhappy man than a happy swine” . It seems that a 
certain level of arousal, lying between the extremes of too much and 
too little, is felt as most pleasant. The attainment of higher valued 
feelings of positive lust depends most of all on changes in levels of 
excitement. Through eating we reduce hunger, but eating itself con­
stitutes a pleasure. Thus, the satiation of needs, the attainment of 
“lust” (pleasure, enjoyment) may not be the only or ultimate personal 
goal; it may turn people into “contented cows” , leading to idleness, 
reduced incentive for creativity, neglect or avoidance of problems and 
conflicts (Arendt, 1958; Nozick, 1989; Veenhoven, 1989: 2).
(3) Happiness as a utility function o f individuals. Not all economists 
have subscribed to the simple equation of objective well being with 
subjective happiness, nor to the assumption that factual consumer 
behaviour does reflect the true tastes of people (Scitovsky, 1976: 4f). 
The Swiss economists Frey and Stutzer (2002: 19ff) formulate a more 
complex well-being function. Here, self-reported well being (mea­
sured on a cardinal scale) is seen as a function of a set of determi­
nants, including the respondent’s actual or “real” well being (utility) 
which is known only to him, personality characteristics, social 
background factors, social networks and economic factors. As far as 
income is concerned they find, for instance, that higher income has a 
substantial positive effect on happiness only in developing countries; 
that happiness does not increase over time with rising income; and 
that groups with relatively low income are not necessarily less happy.
Economic utility theories and theories of relative deprivation are 
an improvement compared to the former theories insofar, as they 
include social processes. Yet, they do so in an incomplete way. First, 
the reasons given for a positive association between higher levels of 
income and well being may be questioned. Factual market and 
consumer behaviour of individuals may not directly reflect their true 
tastes (Zahn, 1960; Scitovsky, 1976: 5). Therefore, even some 
economists (Galbraith, 1958; Easterlin, 1974; Frank, 1999) do not
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subscribe to the view that “money buys happiness.” Second, theories 
of this kind assume that men must either be “driven” by innate 
motives or “dragged along” by considerations of utility in order to 
become active. This view does not correspond to reality since human 
beings are active since birth all the time and in a variety of ways and 
derive their greatest satisfactions out of their action (Huizinga, 1956; 
Arendt, 1958; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Ryan and Deci, 2000: 68; 
Sprenger, 2002). Therefore, economists must resort to additional 
concepts and explanations for their findings, such as the theory of 
relative comparison groups, the concept of aspiration levels, psy­
chological adaptation processes and the like.
(4) Happiness as the result o f comparison processes with other 
groups (;relative satisfaction). Research on the quality of life persis­
tently finds only a weak correlation between the objective position of 
an individual or a social group and their level of subjective well being 
(Glatzer and Zapf, 1984). Even relatively deprived people and social 
groups are often rather satisfied with their economic situation (Haller 
and Hadler, 2002). Studies on revolutions showed that they often do 
not break out in economic depression phases or among the most 
deprived groups of a population, but in relatively prosperous periods 
or among relatively well-off social groups (Davies, 1962). Here, the 
famous theory of relative deprivation has been developed which 
states that most people are satisfied because they compare their sit­
uation with other persons in similar but not with those in much better 
or worse situations or positions (Merton, 1967). But also these the­
ories are not satisfactory. Typical for them is a kind of post-hoc 
theorizing: If the researcher finds that the happiness of a person or 
group does not correspond to his objective situation, he/she looks 
along for possible comparison groups in other, better or worse situ­
ations which could explain the discrepancy. In principle, it would be 
possible to grasp the relevant comparison groups or to measure the 
aspiration levels independently; but also in this case, the question 
would remain how and why people select specific reference groups or 
develop specific aspiration levels. Individuals “often take an active 
role in the comparison process by selecting targets and domains that 
are likely to result in beneficial comparisons.” (Diener and Suh, 1997: 
203)
(5) Happiness as a persistent national or cultural characteristic. 
Many studies have shown that happiness varies substantially between
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nations and that these differences are relatively stable over time. This 
has led some to argue that happiness must be considered as a rela­
tively fixed characteristic of nations or cultures (Inglehart and Rabier, 
1986: 43; Inkeles, 1989). They seem echoing Durkheim’s (1973) 
statement that the social rate of suicide emerges from the moral 
constitution of a society. However, there exists theoretical and 
empirical arguments against this assertion (Veenhoven, 1994): in 
some countries, the level of happiness remained stable over the last 
decades, in others, it underwent significant change;2 variations within 
countries in levels of happiness are considerable; and the intercountry 
variations seem to be related significantly to some macrosocial 
characteristics (e.g., economic affluence). Thus, also the thesis of 
happiness as a more or less persistent characteristic of nations is not 
convincing. Its main methodological weakness is that it takes the 
variable “nation” as a kind of “black-box” which does not spell out 
in detail the mechanisms which make people in some nations more 
happy than in others (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Haller, 2002). 
What is necessary here is to disentangle the complex variable “na­
tion” into sub-dimensions which are theoretically meaningful and can 
be handled empirically. This includes also an abandonment 
of attempts at overall characterisations of whole nations or societies 
in general terms (for example as “collectivistic” or “individualistic” 
in Veenhoven (1999)).
The Definition of Happiness and Life Satisfaction 
and the Instruments for their Measurement
So far we have not distinguished between the two concepts of 
“happiness” and “life satisfaction” which certainly is necessary, even 
if they are related closely to each other. Let us first look at the 
concept of “happiness” . Here we can distinguish between two 
meanings: One is related to the moment in which we live, the other to 
life as whole. Happiness as an outcome of a specific, actual experience 
is something which everybody of us knows, and which is described by 
poets, song-writers and film-makers again and again. Already in these 
examples, however, happiness is more than just an exciting psycho­
physical sensation as it is implied in the concepts of “pleasure” or 
“lust” . Happiness -  just as “satisfaction” -  contains three elements: a 
(cognitive) assumption, an evaluation, and a (positive) feeling based
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on the first two (Nozick, 1989: 132). Feelings of love3 will be more 
intense the better we know the loved; happiness at the mountain peak 
depends also on the duration and difficulty of the climb as well as on 
our knowledge of its height. The human feeling of happiness is a 
“conscious emotion” , a cognitive interpretation of experiences on the 
basis of a self (Damasio, 1999). German philosophical anthropology 
(M. Scheler, A. Gehlen) argued that human emotions are arranged in 
a hierarchical order, going from pure sensual emotions up to the 
highest level of spiritual and personality emotions; happiness is seen 
as being part of the latter (Rehberg, 1997).
Thus, we cannot distinguish between happiness and satisfaction 
by assuming that the latter includes a cognitive experience while the 
former is just an emotion as Campbell et al. (1976: 8) and Lane 
(2000: 275) have argued (see Gundelach and Kreiner, 2004: 363). 
Using data of the US-General Social Survey, Croolcer and Near 
(1998) could show that life satisfaction and happiness were influ­
enced directly by a measure of positive affect (composed of three 
items: positive view of other people as fair, helpful and to be trus­
ted). It may be true, however, that satisfaction includes more a 
calculating component and may be defined as the perceived dis­
crepancy between aspirations, expectations and achievements 
(Michalos, 1980; Campbell et al., 1986). However, a cognitive com­
ponent is also present in the case of happiness. We would not con­
sider a person as being truly happy if we knew that it is based on 
fully erroneous assumptions. This element seems to be captured well 
by the term “prudential happiness” , coined by Haybron (2003: 306) 
after the Greek term “eudaimonia” .
The conceptual distinction between satisfaction and happiness can 
be made more clear by referring to the well-established fact that the 
absence of negative experiences need not lead to positive feelings; 
rather, it is only through positive experiences, that pleasure and 
happiness arise. This important insight was clearly formulated in the 
pioneer study of Bradburn and Caplovitz when they state that a man 
can be depressed or worried about specific issues and very happy at 
the same time (Bradburn and Caplovits, 1965: 19). These authors 
developed items and scales measuring negative and positive experi­
ences separately. The independence of these two dimensions could 
also be shown in a study of working women in Austria; this study 
confirmed also a further implication of this theory, namely that
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overall happiness depends on the balance of positive and negative 
experiences and feelings (Haller, 1981).
Finally, we have to ask which kinds of experiences and states 
typically may lead to high satisfaction or to high happiness, respec­
tively. In connection to the afore mentioned element of an overall 
evaluation in the concept of satisfaction, we may hypothesize that 
satisfaction is related more to the material circumstances of living, 
including things such as physical well being and health. A handi­
capped or chronically ill person may be rather satisfied with his or her 
present state of health even if for other persons that situation looks 
rather depressing. Yet, the chronically ill knows that his situation 
could also be much worse. A quite different situation exists if we say 
that a person is very happy. The highest experience of happiness has 
always been that of falling in love, an incident which cannot be 
“planned” or achieved out of one’s will. However, true happiness 
must have some “inertia” (Haybron, 2003): people who are happy 
tend to remain it over time (Nozick, 1989).
Thus, a first assumption of our paper is that both life satisfaction 
and happiness are related to our life as a whole. This comes out 
clearly in the spelling of the two questions contained in the World 
Value Survey that will be used in the following empirical analysis:
“(V10) Taking all things together, would you say you are: very happy (1), quite happy 
(2), not very happy (3), not at all happy (4)
“(V65) All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these 
days? Please use this card for your answer.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Dissatisfied Satisfied”
Why are happiness or satisfaction with life as a whole so important to 
us? Robert Nozick gives two reasons (Nozick, 1989:137): first, because 
the feeling of happiness as such is enjoyable; second, however, because 
a life which is considered as being happy is also considered as being a 
“good life” . A life which does not contain other valuable elements 
cannot be a happy life. Happiness, in this sense, comes only in con­
nection with other things which are evaluated as positive. Thus, both 
satisfaction with life and happiness (the first probably even more so) 
depend also on our expectations, standards and ambitions; and these 
are accessible to our control. Happiness and life satisfaction cannot be 
realized or arise outside of social relations and outside of society. This
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applies even to the hermit who defines his happiness only in (negative) 
reference to the outside world. Humans have always evaluated 
the social structure and institutions in view of their possibility to enable 
“a long life and happiness” (Boudon, 2002: 108). Based on the 
preceding considerations we suppose, however, that there exists a 
significant difference between the main determinants of happiness and 
life satisfaction:
Hypothesis 1: Happiness and life satisfaction will be closely correlated with each 
other but happiness will be determined in the first instance by positive and close 
social relationships while life satisfaction will be influenced more strongly by the 
objective-material conditions of life, including macrosocial structures and institu­
tions.
Let us now look at the concrete social relations, structures and 
institutions that are most relevant for happiness.
H O W  SO CIAL RELATIO NS, STRU C TU RES AND IN STITU TIO N S  
PRODUCE, F AC ILITATE  AND IN H IBIT  THE EM ERGENCE OF H APPIN ESS  
AND LIFE SATISFAC TIO N
We may distinguish four relevant areas here: (1) basic social rela­
tions and personal networks (microsocial context I); (2) sociocul­
tural integration (microsocial context II); (3) occupational 
achievements and social status (“microsocial” context III); (4) 
societal and political structures and institutions (macrosocial con­
text). Our argument in this regard is that certain social relations and 
conditions in some cases can directly produce happiness or unhap­
piness (these two processes have to be distinguished clearly from 
each other); in most cases, however they can be considered as fac­
tors facilitating their emergence. In the following considerations and 
hypotheses, we try to specify the concrete processes whereby these 
effects come about.
(1) Basic social relations and networks (microsocial context I). In 
his classical study on Suicide, Durkheim (1973) has shown that social 
relationships protect individuals and are essential for them to fulfil 
their basic needs. For David Hume, the pursuit of happiness, a 
fundamental human goal, can be attained only in connection with 
other people (Bellebaum and Barheier, 1997). Numerous studies have 
corroborated the finding that good and close relationships with other 
people -  partners and spouses, parents and children, kinsmen,
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friends, neighbours and workmates -  are a major source of satis­
faction with life and happiness (Bradburn, 1969; Glatzer and Zapf, 
1984; Argyle, 1987; Schulz et al., 1988; Veenhoven, 1989, 1999; 
Myers, 1993, 2000; Schulz, 1995; Eckersley, 2000; Land et al., 2001; 
Michalos et al., 2001). Out of these considerations, we formulate a 
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Life satisfaction, but especially happiness will be higher among those 
persons and groups, and in those nations, where people are better embedded in close 
social relations and networks than among persons, groups and societies where less 
dense networks of social relations exist. The most significant forms of social 
embedding in this regard are marriage and family.
(2) Sociocultural (religious) integration and altruism (microsocial 
context II). According to Fromm (1956), “true love” exists only if we 
are ready to give love to others. The highest level of happiness may be 
obtained when we work or live for other people, for a community or 
for god. An Israeli study found that some young people reported the 
most profound experiences of happiness in connection with voluntary 
prosocial activities (Magen, 1996). The philosopher Merleau-Ponty 
(1960) argues that in a relationship wherein two persons care for each 
other, the borderline between egoism and altruism or love becomes 
blurred. For the psychoanalyst Suttie (1963), every child is born with 
an impulse to receive and to give love to others; only inhibitions to 
this basic need produce frustration and anxieties. In his “theory of 
moral sentiments”, Smith (1986) argues that the pursuit of ethical 
standards, the fulfilment of moral obligations is intrinsically con­
nected with the ability to empathize with the situation of others in 
need; in this case, altruism is intrinsically rewarding.
In this regard, two other kinds of social relations and 
integration may be conducive to happiness: membership in voluntary 
associations, and membership in a church and religious participation. 
The latter can increase happiness for two reasons. First, because it 
provides a “social order” which protects from excessive individualism 
and anomie (Durkheim, 1964). Second, because religions have a 
spiritual-transcendental component which provides counterintuitive 
beliefs and practices “that are widely spread, literally believed, and 
actively used by a group of people within attempts to understand, 
explain and control those aspects of life, and reality as a whole, that 
escape common sense and ... scientific explanation.” (Pyysiainen,
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2001: 227). Such aspects include fateful suffering and sorrow, which 
cannot be controlled or explained in rational terms.
The World Value Survey contains two questions on subjective 
attitudes which are relevant in this regard. One question (V48) con­
cerns a more altruistic or more egocentric view of social relationships:
“To build good human relationships, it is most important to try to understand other’s 
preferences or to express one’s own preferences clearly.”
The first alternative clearly comes closer to Fromm’s understanding 
of love as an altruistic relation; thus, we expect that persons sub­
scribing to it are happier.
One further question (VI77) concerns thinking about the meaning 
of life:
“How often, i f  at all, do you think about the meaning and purpose o f life? ( Often, 
sometimes, rarely, never).”
At first sight, people who often think about the meaning of life, who 
are more reflexive, should also be more satisfied with it. However, this 
thinking might also come out of high ethical-moral standards, or out 
of personal problems; in both cases, it would not necessarily be 
associated with higher happiness. These considerations lead to the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Life satisfaction and particularly happiness will be higher among 
members and active participants of a religious denomination than among non­
members and non-participants; they will be higher among the members of those 
denominations which emphasize wordly achievements; and they will be higher 
among more altruistically minded persons.
(3) Occupational participation and achievement and social status 
(microsocial context III). Since its foundation, sociology has shown 
theoretically and empirically that work and occupation are among the 
most important elements for personal development and fulfilment. A 
stable employment and work, an occupation and career provide 
structure and continuity to daily life; they are one of the main areas for 
the development of knowledge and capacities; they provide a regular 
income and the basis for the material support of one’s own life and of 
dependent persons; and they are main sources for self-respect and 
social status (Arendt, 1958; Jahoda, 1982; Hughes, 1997). A high 
status, on its side, is a main source not only for further material 
improvement, for power and influence, but can also be striven for in
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order to attain the love of others (de Botton, 2004). Out of these 
considerations, we formulate a fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: A qualified occupation and a high occupational position, a high in­
come, and a high social status promote life satisfaction and happiness (the first more 
than the second), while involuntary unemployment, low occupational and low social 
status reduce satisfaction and happiness.
(4) Macrosocial and institutional context. How can macrosocial 
conditions, like the general level of wealth in a country, the extent of 
welfare services, political democracy and the like, have an impact on 
individual happiness? Already Durkheim has argued that the progress 
of the division of labour cannot be explained by the striving toward 
happiness; he quotes Comte’s thesis that we must “dismiss as vain and 
futile the vague metaphysical controversy concerning the increase of 
man’s happiness in the various ages of civilization” (Durkheim, 1964: 
251; Kuzmics, 1989). In spite of the fact that modernity is associated 
with the idea that happiness can be produced, it is evident that indi­
vidual happiness depends in the first instance upon private social 
relations (Klages, 1992). Nevertheless, we think that macrosocial and 
political conditions can have significant effects, particularly on life 
satisfaction. The following aspects are relevant here.
The first is the level of economic development or wealth, as 
measured by GDP/head. In accordance with the foregoing consid­
erations, we include also (a) the growth in GDP/head over the 1990s; 
(b) the distribution of national wealth, the degree of economic 
inequality in a country. Both these dimensions may influence in a 
significant way the perception of the well being and also the happi­
ness of the members of a society. A country with high degrees of 
economic and social inequality is not very attractive. Moreover, high 
inequality may lead to additional social problems and conflicts (e.g. 
high levels of crime and violence, sharp industrial and political con­
flicts.4 Corresponding with this fact, it has been shown recently that 
subjective well-being in Europe is significantly higher in small coun­
tries (European Foundation, 2004).
As two additional macrosocial-institutional dimensions, we will 
consider the welfare state and the degree of political freedom in a 
country. The importance of the welfare state is evident: This was the 
main societal institution developed in order to cope with the
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dissolution of traditional, family and community-based forms of 
social provision and security. The welfare state secures a decent 
standard of living to all members of a society, irrespective of their 
gender, age, employment status and health. Thus, the extent of wel­
fare state provisions (measured by social expenditures) should also be 
relevant for satisfaction and happiness. The other dimension con­
sidered is political freedom. In classical Greek philosophy, political 
freedom was a precondition for the attainment of happiness (eudai- 
monia) which on its side was closely connected with health and 
prosperity (Arendt, 1958). For the Greeks, freedom was closely re­
lated to equality between the citizens. This was a central point also in 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s classical work on Democracy in America 
(Tocqueville, 1947).
Based on these general considerations, the following hypothesis is 
put forward:
Hypothesis 5: The degree of happiness and, in particular, of satisfaction with life as a 
whole will significantly vary between nations and it will reflect their economic wealth, 
and their economic and stratification structure and political order. Happiness and life 
satisfaction will be higher in economically well-developed, rich countries; in countries 
with a positive economic development in the past decade; in countries with less 
economic inequality; and in countries with extended welfare provisions and with 
political systems where citizens are free to express and put forth their interests. 
Moreover, social class and status differences in happiness and life satisfaction should 
be larger in societies which show higher degrees of economic inequality and which are 
less free in political terms.
DATA SETS, QUESTIONS AND INDICATORS,
AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS
The data base of our empirical analysis is the World Value Survey 
1995-1997 (WVS 95) which contained two questions on happiness and 
life satisfaction, resp. (their formulation has been quoted above).5 
This is one of the few large, comparative surveys which have been 
carried out since the early 1980s already three times in many nations 
around the world (Inglehart et al., 2000). The World Value Survey 
1995-1997 included about 70 different states, regions and cities. 
In some large countries, only certain provinces were randomly 
sampled, -  provinces whichtend to be the more urban and rich ones.6 
After combining the sub-regions into one whole country where
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necessary,7 and excluding other countries because of many missing 
values, 41 countries could be used for the present empirical analysis.
The two questions on overall happiness and life satisfaction (see 
above) will both be used as separate dependent variables in the fol­
lowing analysis, based on our assumption that they -  albeit closely 
related to each other -  measure somewhat different aspects of sub­
jective well being.
We use the method of multilevel regression analysis in order to 
distinguish in a methodologically sound way between the effects of 
characteristics of the individuals and of the countries as a whole.8 A 
multilevel analysis has several advantages over a simple regression 
analysis (Goldstein, 1995:3): first, it results in statistically efficient 
estimates of the regression coefficients; second, by using the context 
data (country characteristics), it produces correct standard errors, 
confidence intervals and significance tests, and these are usually more 
“conservative” than those obtained with an ordinary regression; third, 
by allowing the use of covariates measured at both levels, it enables one 
to explore interaction effects. For the statistical analysis, we used the 
program Mlwin (Rabash et al., 2000). As the dependent variables are 
not strictly normal distributed, robust standard errors were estimated 
which are more reliable.
Four kinds of determinants of the dependent variables “happiness” 
and “life satisfaction” are distinguished, corresponding to our 
hypotheses.
-  Individual sociodemographic characteristics and feelings. Here, we 
included age and gender, subjective health and the feeling of 
having free choice and control over one’s life. These basic char­
acteristics may be related significantly to happiness. The relative 
position of women and men is different in all societies; while men 
occupy higher status positions in the world of work, women might 
have some advantage in regard to family relations. However, so far 
research did not find significant effects of gender (Inglehart and 
Rabier, 1986; Hayo and Seifert, 2003; Christoph and Noll, 2003). 
In every society, age is a socially standardized and evaluated cat­
egory; in our society, youth is generally higher evaluated than old 
age, while persons in the middle age categories are most involved in 
work and family. Several studies have shown that the relation of 
happiness to age is u-shaped: The younger, but also the older
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people tend to be more happy (Inglehart and Rabier, 1986; 
Michalos et al., 2001; Hayo and Seifert, 2003; Christoph and Noll, 
2003). Subjective health has been shown by many studies to be one 
of the most important determinants of happiness. A certain degree 
of freedom is an essential element of human action (compared with 
animal behaviour). Thus, if a human act has been carried out of a 
free decision, it is gratifying per se because it deploys the essence of 
human beings, to act in a conscious and deliberate manner. Per­
sons who feel that they are free in their lives should therefore be 
more happy than those who do not have this feeling.9
-  Family situation and social and religious embedding. Here, we in­
clude marital status, presence of children, religious denomination 
and participation, and membership in voluntary associations. Also 
the items “altruistic orientation” and frequence of thinking about 
the meaning of life are relevant in this repard.
-  Work and status. Here, we consider level of education, employ­
ment participation, occupational status, income, and subjective 
social class. In this regard, also some subjective variables were 
included: satisfaction with financial situation, the perception of 
the chances to escape poverty, and subjective social class 
placement.
-  Macrosocial indicators. Five characteristics of the countries were 
considered: Level of economic development or wealth (GNP/ 
head), economic growth during the Nineties (GDP/growth), in­
come distribution (GINI coefficients), social expenditures and 
degree of political freedom. Social expenditures reflect welfare 
expenditures in percentage of total state expenditures; they com­
prise expenditures for social welfare, education, health and 
housing (data were taken from the World Development Report of 
the World Bank and the Government Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund).10 The figures for all countries in 
these indicators are put together in Table A.I. The measure for 
political freedom was taken from a data set compiled by Freedom 
House, New York; it varies between 1 (fully free) and 8 (no 
freedom).11 In this index, most West-European and Anglo-Saxon 
countries have scores indicating high freedom (below 2); then 
follow Latin-American and post-communist countries (values 
2-A); at the end we find China, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Turkey, 
Belarus and Peru (above 5.0).12
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON DETERMINANTS OF LIFE 
SATISFACTION AND HAPPINESS
Let us now look at the results of the multivariate, multilevel analysis 
of happiness and life satisfaction. In the presentation of the findings, 
we begin with a discussion of the effects of the sociodemographic 
characteristics and individual attitudes, then we discuss the results 
concerning our hypotheses. In Table A.I, we present also the bivar- 
iate correlations between all independent and dependent variables; in 
this way, the reader can compare them with the corresponding 
coefficients in the multivariate analyses. Table A.II contains all 
macro-level characteristics for the countries included.
Basic Sociodemographic Characteristics, Attitudes and Feelings
Age or position in the life cycle: The “happy youth”: In Table I, we can 
see that satisfaction and happiness vary significantly by age. 
Respondents below 39 years, and especially those under 29, are sig­
nificantly more happy and satisfied with their lives than the older.13 
This finding may be related to the fact that adolescence is a time full 
of new experiences and challenges, of opportunities and hopes while 
adult life brings about many obligations and strains.
Women are happier than men. The surprising strength of the weak 
sex. Table I shows also that women are significantly more happy than 
men and this in spite of the fact (shown in Haller and Hadler (2004)) 
that they feel to have less freedom to decide about their ways of life 
(see also Di Telia et al., 2001; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; no effects of sex 
on happiness were found in Inglehart and Rabier, 1986: 9ff; Chris­
toph and Noll, 2003; Hayo and Seifert, 2003). Women throughout 
the world are less involved in the areas of work and public life, and 
have less power of decision in work organizations and politics. Yet, 
all these discriminations do not seem to reduce their happiness and 
life satisfaction. Thus, the positive life experiences of women must be 
so strong that they outbalance their deprivations. We think that a 
confirmation of this explanation is given in the findings concerning 
our second hypothesis (see below).
Subjective health and freedom as determinants o f happiness. In 
Table I we can see that both subjective health and the feeling of 
freedom in life exert significant and strong effects on happiness and
TABLE I
Multilevel regression analysis of happiness and life satisfaction in 34 countries
oo
Happiness (low-high) Life Satisfaction (low-high)
B SE BETA B SE BETA
Constant 1 95** 0.15 29.29** 2.93
Individual characteristics
Women (Ref = men) 0.27** 0.08 0.02 0.73** 0.28 0.01
Age (-29) 0.49** 0.19 0.03 1.83** 0.46 0.03
Age (30-39) 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.80* 0.32 0.01
Age (40-49) (Ref) (Ref)
Age (50-59) -0.12 0.11 -0.00 -0.17 0.31 -0.00
Age (60-69) 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.20 0.37 0.00
Age (70-) 0.33 0.18 0.01 0.51 0.57 0.00
Education (low-high) -0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.17 0.31 -0.01
Decision freedom (low-high) 0.29** 0.04 0.12 1.80** 0.22 0.22
Subj. Health (good-bad) -2.02** 0.10 -0.28 -3.76** 0.24 -0.15
Basic social relations
Married (Ref) (Ref)
Divorced, separated, widowed _2 21 ** 0.19 -0.09 -3.02** 0.35 -0.04
Single -1.49** 0.24 -0.08 -3.03** 0.39 -0.05
Children (No.s 1-4 + ) 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.55** 0.10 0.03
No children or missing value -0.10 0.14 -0.01 -0.35 0.21 -0.01
Work participation and social status
Employed (Ref) (Ref)
















N ot employed/ missing 0.09 0.21
Professional manual workers (Ref)
Manager 0.15 0.13
Skilled worker 0.20* 0.09
Semi skilled worker -0.18 0.10
Farmer 0.01 0.28
Army 0.02 0.24
Never worked -0.14 0.15
Income (low-high) -0.01 0.03
Financial Satisfaction (low-high) 0.51** 0.04
Subjective class (high-low) -0.44** 0.07
No chance esc. poverty -0.46** 0.11
(Ref = chance)










Church Attendance (often-never) -0.17** 0.02
0.03 0.75 0.47 0.01
0.01 1.09* 0.50 0.01
-0.01 -2.04** 0.48 -0.02
0.00 0.44 0.53 0.00
(Ref)
0.00 -0.37 0.38 -0.00
0.01 0.33 0.32 0.00
-0.01 -0.40 0.30 -0.01
0.00 0.21 0.46 0.00
0.00 -0.19 0.89 -0.00
-0.01 0.35 0.32 0.00
-0.00 -0.05 0.09 -0.01
0.20 4.28** 0.21 0.49
-0.07 -0.86** 0.21 -0.04
-0.03 -0.95** 0.36 -0.02
-0.00 0.09 0.25 0.00
(Ref)
0.00 0.40 0.30 0.01
0.02 1.51** 0.53 0.02
-0.00 -0.59 0.55 -0.01
0.00 -0.61 2.17 -0.00
-0.00 -1.23 0.83 -0.01
0.01 0.94 0.59 0.01

















Happiness (low-high) Life Satisfaction (low-high)
B SE BETA B SE BETA
Voluntary membership (no-many) 0.04 0.24 0.00 0.22 0.42 0.00
Think about meaning of life 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.26 0.17 0.01
(often-never)
Others/ own preferences (Ref = other) -0.03 0.12 -0.00 -0.60 0.36 -0.01
Macro social context
Political freedom (high-low) 0.10 0.20 0.02 0.68** 0.22 0.05
GNP*1000 (low-high) 0.09** 0.02 0.13 0.17** 0.05 0.07
Gini-Index (low-high) 0.05* 0.02 0.08 0.09* 0.05 0.04
Growth of GDP (low-high) 0.12* 0.05 0.07 0.45** 0.07 0.08
Social Expenditure -0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.09** 0.02 0.06
i?2makro = 0.807 /?2makro = 0.972
i?2total = 0.265 i?2total = 0.464
N  = 54217 N  = 57317
If an item was not asked in a country or not answered by a respondent, a dummy has been included for this case but is not shown in this table. 
“Other Religion” comprises mainly Buddhist, Hindu, and other Asian religions.
B-Values and Standard Errors are multiplied by 10 for the sake of a better reading.
Significance: **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05
Social expenditures could not be obtained for Armenia, China (here, only a very low, unreliable value is reported in Table II), Macedonia, 
Moldavia, Nigeria, Taiwan, and Ukraine. These countries are therefore excluded.
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life satisfaction. The effect of subjective health (see also Headey et al., 
1984; Fuentes and Rojas, 2001; Michalos et al., 2001) is itself evi­
dence of the importance of the dimension “personal freedom of 
choice” . Sickness is -  in addition to the suffering which it may cause -  
one of the most obvious factors which restricts that freedom (see also 
Headey et al., 1984: 128). These two dimensions are related directly 
to the “capabilities” (Sen, 1999) of a person, that is, his/her possi­
bility to choose a style of life corresponding to his capacities and 
(realistic) wishes.
Basic Social Relations and Sociocultural Integration
Family life is not only a protection against anomie and suicide, as 
Durkheim (1966) has shown, but also against unhappiness. Many 
studies have reported that married people and people with children 
are happier than singles; especially divorced, separated, and wid­
owed persons are significantly less happy and satisfied with their life 
(Inglehart and Rabier, 1986: 23ff; Myers, 2000: 62ff; Hayo and 
Seifert, 2003). Veenhoven (1983) has shown, moreover, that the 
relation of marriage to happiness has not become weaker since the 
1950s, but even stronger. Somewhat surprising is the finding that 
single persons are less happy than the married -  given the image 
that the status of being single can be considered as a prototypical 
modern life-style (see, e.g. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1994). Yet, 
special studies on singles show that their status is not always so 
freely chosen as it appears from the outside. This is confirmed by 
the fact that singles do not feel more free as married persons; 
aloneness often may imply some deficits in social and communal ties 
(Hradil, 1998).14 Children, however, raise life satisfaction but not 
happiness. This may be due to two facts: first, to have children and 
to bring them up is connected also with many burdens and worries; 
second, when they have grown up, children leave the parental 
household and the contacts with them often loose in frequency and 
intensity. In all societies, it is the (marriage) partner to whom one 
turns first for instrumental and emotional assistance (Hollinger and 
Haller, 1990).
Religion and religiosity as significant determinants o f happiness. 
Participation in religious activities has significant effects on happiness: 
regular church goers are significantly more happy than those who
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attend ecclesiastic services more seldom or never. That religion in­
creases personal happiness has been shown by several studies (Ingle- 
hart and Rabier, 1986: 17; Argyle, 1987; Myers, 2000: 63ff). Four 
aspects might be relevant here: first, religions provide a transcendental 
explanation of human life which makes it easier to see some sense also 
in adverse life circumstances; second, communal religious rituals give 
meaning to significant life events and transitions such as birth, mar­
riage or death; third, priests and fellow church-members provide so­
cial support in critical and difficult life situations; fourth, most 
religions contain the idea that the existence and destiny of men depend 
on god; this might help religious people to stand better adverse events 
and experiences.
Our interpretation that an active religious community is more than 
just an association of people in order to carry out common rituals is 
proven by two further findings. First, a related indicator -  member­
ship in associations -  does not show a significant effect on freedom or 
happiness. In this analysis, we have used an index “association 
membership” which has been constructed out of a listing of nine 
different organizations, including political, recreative, cultural and 
charitable organisations. Evidently, the transcendental elements 
contained in a religious community are more important for subjective 
well being than membership in other associations.
One significant albeit weak effect exists regarding membership in 
different religious denominations.15 The effect of Protestantism on 
life satisfaction and happiness is positive. This finding corresponds 
to Weber’s (2003) thesis that individual responsibility for one’s way 
of life and ultimate destiny after death was a central tenet among the 
founders of Protestantism. An outcome of this belief is that prot- 
estants tend to develop an optimistic outlook on life, and are in­
clined to show themselves as successful and happy persons (Willi, 
1966).
Second, the WVS-questionnaire contained a question (V48) con­
cerning a more altruistic or more egocentric view of social relation­
ships:
“To build good human relationships, it is most important to try to understand other’s 
preferences or to express one’s own preferences clearly.”
Research has shown that materialism is related negatively to happi­
ness (Ryan and Dzjurawiec, 2001). Thus, we hypothesized that
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people who have a more altruistic view of social relationships are more 
satisfied with their life than those who hold more to the rationalistic- 
utilitaristic view of human relations as a kind of exchange. This 
hypothesis, however, is not confirmed by our data (see Table I).
Work Participation and Occupational Status
We have argued that work and employment are a main basis for self- 
identity and a satisfying life in modern society. Our findings seem to 
confirm this general thesis in four regards. First, nearly all four 
groups of the non-employed are distinct from the employed con­
cerning happiness and satisfaction. In comparison with employed 
people, the retired are more satisfied with their life and more happy, 
housewifes are more happy, and students more satisfied with their 
life. Contrary to these groups, the unemployed are both less happy 
and less satisfied than employed persons.
The findings 011 housewives and the retired correspond to those on 
marital status and age reported before. Evidently, women who are 
not employed outside of the house have sources of satisfaction within 
their family which more than compensate for gainful work. A similar 
consideration may apply to retired people: they certainly have less 
money, less possibilities to participate in public life and decisions, but 
they have more time to spend with relatives and hobbies, and, when 
they have reduced their material aspirations, they can lead a more 
quiet life.
A myriad of studies showed that unemployment leads to a sig­
nificant deterioration of the personal mood of those affected by it 
(Inglehart and Rabier, 1986: 20; Hayo and Seifert, 2003). That such a 
situation is not looked for freely is more than evident. The unem­
ployed suffer in many regards: their financial situation is bad, and 
they have feelings of being socially “useless”, of being hindered to 
apply and develop further their knowledge and capacities, of lacking 
a perspective for the future, thus, of having no control over their life 
circumstances (Jahoda et al., 1997; Frey and Stutzer, 2002: 95ff).
Only one effect has been found concerning occupational status. 
Skilled workers are more happy than non-manual workers (the ref­
erence category). Since this is only a weak effect, we should not 
speculate too much about it. (However, see Noll and Habich, 1999 
for more significant effects in this regard.)
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In our data, we have also found no significant effect of education 
(such an effect was reported, however, in Inglehart and Rabier (1986) 
and Hayo and Seifert (2003)). Given the fact that rising education is 
one of the most important correlates of modernization, this seems 
quite an interesting result. It reminds one of Durkheim’s thesis, 
mentioned before, that there exists no inherent correlation between 
the increasing divison of labour and happiness. In Weber’s view, 
educational expansion is also motivated by the interests of the for­
mation of a new privileged white-collar stratum.
Subjective economic situation is highly relevant for happiness, 
and, in particular, for life satisfaction. This is not true for income 
alone (see also Headey et al., 1984 and Fuentes and Rojas, 2001; 
significant effects of income alone were reported in Di Telia et al. 
(2001); Frey and Stutzer (2002); Hayo and Seifert (2003).16 Our 
interpretation of this finding is not, however, in terms of relative 
deprivation. Rather, we think the crucial element is the feeling that an 
income is adequate for mastering one‘s daily life. Men who grew up 
in poor families see that situation not only in terms of material 
deprivation, but as leading to “chaotic, arbitrary, and unpredictable 
behaviour ... in other words, as depriving men of the capacity to act 
rationally, to exercise self-control” (Sennett and Cobb, 1972: 22). 
Thus, the objective level of income can be rather low without 
affecting happiness negatively if it only enables a person or a family 
the mastering of life. Biswas-Diener and Diener (2001) carried out an 
interesting study on three extremely poor groups in Calcutta (slum 
dwellers, prostitutes and homeless individuals living on the streets); 
they found that these people were not as unhappy as one could expect; 
their life also included several positive aspects, such as rewarding 
families or religious commitments and the feeling of being “good 
(moral) people” . The fact that “financial satisfaction” has a much 
stronger influence on life satisfaction than on happiness is a clear 
confirmation of the different meanings of these two dimensions, as 
outlined in the first section.
Macrosocial and Institutional Context
A lot of earlier research has shown that nations differ significantly in 
the mean level of happiness of their populations. It is a central tenet 
of our approach, however, to posit not only an overall “nationality”
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or “culture effect” on happiness which would be difficult to interpret. 
Rather, we decompose this variable into several specific, theoretically 
meaningful and measurable components (see Przeworski and Teune, 
1970; Haller, 2002). We introduced five dimensions in this regard: 
wealth of a nation, the growth of wealth, economic inequality, social 
expenditures and political freedom. Before analysing the effect of 
these dimensions, let us look shortly at the distribution of happiness 
over the 42 countries investigated.17
Figure 1 shows an extremely wide variation. A Latin American 
country, Venezuela, lies on top with a mean happiness value of 1.52 
which is clearly above the overall, aggregate mean (2.02). Venezuela 
is followed by the United States, Turkey, Australia and Sweden. 
The first quartile of the distribution -  countries with rather high 
levels of happiness -  include four groups. Two of them are highly 
developed and rich: the United States, Australia, Sweden and 
Norway; and two groups are less developed: Some Latin American 
countries (Chile, Columbia, Venezuela), and some other countries in 
Africa, Asia and Europe (Nigeria, Philippines and Turkey). On the 
bottom of the happiness scale, we find only the poorer post-communist 
countries: Moldava and Belarus show the lowest values. The fourth 
quartile with the lowest values in happiness is composed exclusively of 
post-communist societies.
If we compare the WVS-data of the mid-Nineties on 
happiness of nations with other surveys, the position of some coun­
tries may somewhat change. However, the main rank ordering does 
not differ: We always find the rich West-European and Anglo-Saxon 
countries on the top, and the post-communist as well as very poor 
countries of the Third World on the bottom; the same is true for the 
conspicuous high position of the Latin-American countries (Ingle- 
hart and Rabier, 1986; Veenhoven, 1993; Schyns, 1998; Diener, 
2000; Myers, 2000; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Vitterso et al., 2002; 
Christoph and Noll, 2003). Thus, we can see that the rank order of 
the countries corresponds by and large to the objective life situation, 
albeit some exceptions do exist. The first are Latin American countries 
whose level of development is rather modest and which are also 
characterized by high degrees of internal inequality, and many eco­
nomic, social and political problems. The second exception are a few 
other less developed countries around the world, like Nigeria, the 
Philippines and Turkey.
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A similar distribution results in the variable of happiness. Here, 
Columbia and Switzerland are on top, and Ukraine and Moldova on 
bottom. However, the overall ranking order of countries is quite 
similar. Happiness and life satisfaction are closely related to each 
other; the correlation coefficient at the individual level is 0.35; at the 
aggregate level it is 0.87.
However, while the general rank order of the countries in the two- 
dimensions is quite similar, the deviations from the common pattern 
are very instructive. Figure 2 shows two groups of countries with a 
relatively higher level of happiness than life satisfaction. The first 
group includes several countries around the world (in particular 
Venezuela and Turkey, but also the Philippines, South Africa, 
Nigeria and Japan), most of which are rather poor; the second group 
includes half a dozen post-communist countries (Azerbaijan, Latvia, 
Georgia, Armenia, Ukraina, Moldova), also most of them rather 
poor.
On the other side, we see that people in the Scandinavian 
countries (particularly in Finland), in Germany and in the more 
developed central East European, post-communist countries 
(Germany East, Slovenia, Croatia) are relatively less happy com­
pared to their mean level of life satisfaction. The same is true in 
some Latin American countries (Columbia, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, 
Uruguay). These differences fit in very well into our hypotheses 
about the meaning and determinants of “life satisfaction” and 
happiness, the former relating more to the objective material and 
social living conditions, the latter to dense and gratifying close 
relationships. We know, for instance, that Islamic societies are 
characterized by very close family relationships.18 (Turkey has 99% 
Muslims, Nigeria 45%); the same may be true for the Philippines 
and South Africa, and even for Japan, a highly developed country 
(see Shimada, 1976). Venezuela, the only Latin American country 
which also falls into this group, is one of the poorer Latin Amer­
ican countries, and it has also a high proportion (around 70%) 
mestizo and mulatto population. As far as the importance of close 
social relations is concerned, the same may be true for the less 
developed among the European and Asian post-communist coun­
tries. In those societies, surviving often may be possible only due to 
the fact that family and kinship networks provide extensive support 
for the individual in psychic, social and economic regards. One
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Figure 1. Happiness in 41 countries (mean values).
Source: World Value Survey 1995-1997.
HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS 19 5
author of this paper published a study comparing attitudes among 
Muslims in Israel and Bulgaria with non-Muslims in these countries 
and with European countries and the USA (Haller, 2003). It was
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Figure 2. The distribution of 41 countries by life satisfaction and happiness (scat­
ter gram of national mean values).
Source: World Values Survey 1995-1997.
found that among 17 domains of attitudes those toward sexuality 
and marriage distinguished most sharply between the Muslims and 
all other groups; for the Muslims premarital chastity and marital 
sexual fidelity are much more important. On the other side, it may 
well be that the Scandinavian welfare states, while providing 
comprehensive material and instrumental-social support for their 
members, have not been able to increase their “happiness” to the 
same degree. Yet, the public provision of many services may also 
have contributed to a loosening or even break-up of close marital 
and familial relationships.
In addition to these structural-institutional aspects, there may also 
be a cultural effect at work here. Several studies, some of them based
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on the Eurobarometer, have shown that significant differences in 
levels of happiness exist within Europe which cannot be explained 
otherwise (Inglehart and Rabier, 1986; Christoph and Noll, 2003; 
Gundelach and Kreimer, 2004). The Dutch and the Danes are on top, 
but Germans and Finns score relatively low in happiness.
In order to test our hypotheses directly, let us now look at the 
effects of the macrosocial variables on happiness and life satisfaction, 
controlling for all other influences as it is done in multiple regression 
analysis. As we can see in Table 1, in fact all of those variables exert 
significant effects on life satisfaction (and most of them also on 
happiness).
The economic prospects o f a country are very decisive, but also the 
objective level o f wealth has an impact on happiness. Here we find, first, 
that GNP/head has significant positive effects on happiness and life 
satisfaction. Even more important is the effect of economic growth 
during the 1990s: if it was high, people are more happy and satisfied 
with life (see also Hayo and Seifert, 2003). Thus, it is not only the 
objective situation of an individual or a society at a certain point in 
time which influences his subjective evaluation but the way how a 
person feels to be able to cope with that situation, in view of past 
experiences and future expectations.
Let us look at this relationship also in graphic form. Figure 3 
shows the scattergram of nations according GNP/head and the 
mean level of life satisfaction of their populations. By and large, 
there is no evidence of a strong correlation. The distribution 
approximates an exponential curve (Frey and Stutzer, (2002) found 
a similar curvilinear association; linear relations are reported in 
Diener et al. (1995) and Schyns (1998)). There exist three different 
groups of countries: first, the post-communist societies with a ra­
ther low GNP/head and low happiness; second, the more developed 
and rich countries with relatively high levels of happiness; here no 
correlation between GNP and satisfaction levels exists; third, a 
large group of very poor countries within which wide variations in 
happiness exists, here, we find the countries with the low­
est (Moldovia) and the highest value in life satisfaction (Colombia) 
in the whole sample. We can conclude that affluence seems to 
guarantee a certain level of satisfaction,19 but obviously there exist 
also non-material social and cultural factors which can lead to high 
levels of happiness.
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GNP per capita
Figure 3. Economic wealth (GNP per capita) and life satisfaction in 41 countries. 
Source: World Values Survey 1995-1997.
The findings concerning the effects of the income distribution 
clearly contradict to our hypothesis. Table I shows that countries 
with higher inequality have a happier population. This surprising 
finding becomes more plausible when we look at the distribution of 
the countries in regard to overall income inequality. Far on top in this 
regard are the South American countries which, at the same time, are 
characterized by very high levels of happiness; a rather low level of 
income inequality, however, is typical for the post communist 
countries which, at the same time, are characterized by the lowest 
levels of happiness of their citizens. Our findings in this regard seem 
to confirm liberal critics of an excessive and enforced egalitarianism 
(Hayek, 1960; Schoeck, 1960; Letwin, 1983). They also make sense 
seen from the perspective of John Rawls’ “liberal” theory of justice. 
In his view, inequality is tolerable if it is combined with positive
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perspectives for an improvement of all and, thus, acceptable also to 
the less privileged groups (Rawls, 1972; Methfessel and Winterberg, 
1998).
However, we found one significant and interesting interaction 
effect in this regard. Figure 4 shows the relation between subjective 
class placement and life satisfaction within the different countries. 
First, in actual terms, happiness in general is decreasing with 
decreasing social class. There exists one group of countries, however, 
where the upper classes show a significant lower life satisfaction than 
the middle classes. All of them -  Latvia, Ukraine, Estonia, Russia 
and Lithuania -  are post-communist societies and former members of 
the Soviet Union. In all these countries many members of the former 
ruling class, the “Nomenclatura” (Voslensky, 1982), have been shorn 
of power (Lane and Ross, 1997) -  a fact which can well explain there 
lower level of life satisfaction today.
The predicted relations between subjective social class and life 
satisfaction (controlling for all other effects), show two other 
interaction effects (not shown in a separate graphic). On the one 
side, in Brazil, Argentina and Sweden, members of the lower classes 
are slightly happier than those of the upper classes.20 On the other 
side, in Armenia, South-Africa, India and Bangladesh, and in most 
other less developed post-communist societies, persons who place 
themselves into the lower class, are significantly less satisfied with 
their life. In West Europe, North and South America, life satis­
faction does not vary by class placement. Corresponding to these 
differences, we can also see that the overall variation in life satis­
faction and happiness is relatively low in the more developed 
Western countries (particularly so in the Scandinavian countries), 
but rather high in the poorer countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America.
Several conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, in the 
more developed nations, the general increase in wealth and the 
development of welfare states have obviously improved also the sit­
uation of the lower classes significantly. Second, in Latin American 
and some other rather poor countries in Africa and South-East Asia, 
we must again suppose that important factors other than the material 
standard of living must exist leading to high happiness. Third, the 
transition process from state-socialist to market societies has evi­
dently had a much more negative impact on the lower than on the
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Figure 4. Mean life satisfaction among different social classes in 41 countries*. 
Source: World Values Survey 1995-1997.
middle classes (except the upper classes). State socialism might itself 
have contributed to this perverse effect (see also Lewada, 1972). A 
political- economic system which had declared equality as one of its 
main goals, in terms of subjective well-being has produced more 
inequality than the market-oriented, capitalist western societies. (In 
terms of income distribution, however, it has in fact produced more 
equality.)
It is quite obvious, therefore, that the possibility of an 
improvement of the overall economic situation is a very important 
fact besides the issues of poverty and inequality. Table I shows that 
the growth of the GDP over the Nineties has a significant and 
rather strong effect. There exist strong positive and nearly linear 
associations21 between economic growth and happiness/life satis­
faction at the macrolevel. This correlation probably explains the 
striking result that happiness and satisfaction are rather high in 
most Latin American countries, but very low in the post-communist 
East European countries, in spite of the fact that the level of GNP/ 
head is rather low in both. The Latin American countries had rather
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high growth rates during the Nineties (between 3% and 8%). In 
contrast, the East European countries and the successor states of the 
former Soviet Union experienced sharp declines in standards of 
living connected with their transition from centrally planned, state 
socialist systems to market societies (decreases of GNP between 3% 
and 10%). In a survey on ten post-communist East European 
countries in the early 1990s, Hayo and Seifert, (2003) found that 
only between 17% (Poland) and 58% (Czech Republic) of the 
respondents considered their economic household situation as sat­
isfactory, compared with 86% in Austria; only 35-50% expected an 
improvement. Evidently, the future economic perspectives of a 
country make people optimistic also about their own situation; they 
give them the feeling that opportunities are there and it depends on 
their own behaviour how their situation will develop. People in 
Latin America score highest in the WVS-item “work makes life 
worth living” as well. Also changes in levels of inflation are corre­
lated significantly with happiness over time (Frey and Stutzer, 2002: 
11 Iff).
A set of three additional individual attitudes in Table I is related 
to social perceptions and attitudes concerning our hypothesis 2, the 
stratification system of a society. Two questions were related to the 
perception of inequality and poverty in the immediate past and to the 
chances of poor people to improve their lot in the future (Items VI71 
and V173):
“Would you say that today a larger share, about the same share, or a 
smaller share o f the people o f this country are living in poverty than 
were ten years ago?”
“In your opinion, do most poor people in this country have a chance of 
escaping from poverty, or is there very little chance o f escaping?”
Table I shows that the estimation of changes in the amount of 
poverty during the last ten years does not have any effect on happi­
ness or life satisfaction. The estimation of the present chances of poor 
people to escape their lot, however, does have significant effects. 
Persons who think that poor people in general have good chances to 
escape from poverty, are more happy and satisfied with their life. The 
percentages in the different societies who agree with this statement, 
vary extremely: in Taiwan and China, nearly 90% of the respondents 
think that poor people have a chance to escape poverty; at the other
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pole, only 8% of East Germans think in the same way. Generally, we 
find people in the highly developed Western societies and Japan on 
the top (60-80% agree see good chances), and some Latin American 
societies (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay) and the poorer post­
communist East European societies on the bottom (in Russia, 
Ukraine and Lithuania, only about 15% see good chances for poor 
people here).
Welfare state expenditures and political freedom are decisive 
determinants for life satisfaction (and partly also for happiness) o f 
the population. Table I shows, finally, that the macro dimensions 
of the extent of the welfare state (social expenditures as percent of 
all state expenditures) and political freedom indeed have the 
effects on life satisfaction, which were postulated in our hypothesis 
5.22 The reason why some studies did not found an effect of 
welfare state expenditures (e.g., Veenhoven, 2000) is probably that 
they did not distinguish carefully between micro and macrolevel 
effects. Thus, our consideration that the welfare state secures a 
stable income and decent life conditions for all groups of a 
population and thereby increases life satisfaction, does clearly turn 
out. The same is true for the consideration that in stable demo­
cratic systems and free market societies, households and enter­
prises can rely more on trustful and reliable relations to other 
people, to organisations and to the state; this enhances their 
possibilities of long-term planning. Frey and Stutzer (2002: 133ff; 
see also Schyns, 1998) have argued that instruments of direct 
democracy, like referenda, can enlarge considerably the real 
political freedom and influence of the citizens. For Switzerland 
they show that the degree of participation in the different prov­
inces (cantons) has a significant effect on happiness of the people 
living there.
Very important is also the fact that life satisfaction, but not 
happiness is correlated significantly with these two macro variables. 
A stable and secure democracy, and an extended welfare state evi­
dently increase the quality of material, social and political life, but 
they contribute less to personal happiness. Thus, our hypothesis 
about the different meaning of these two dimensions-the first relating 
more to the absence of poverty, and the presence of good socioeconomic 
conditions of life, the second to positive factors producing happiness -has 
been confirmed again.
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CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Let us first summarize shortly our main findings and then draw some 
conclusions about further research.
First, it seems that our general hypothesis was clearly confirmed, 
stating that life satisfaction and happiness will be the outcome of an 
interaction process between individual characteristics, aspirations 
and expectations on the one, and micro- and macrosocial relations 
and structures on the other side. Most of the individual characteris­
tics and attitudes that we captured in this analysis, exerted significant 
and partly very strong effects on life satisfaction and happiness 
(gender and age, subjective health, financial satisfaction and feeling of 
being free). In regard to the objective life situation it appeared that it 
is their subjective perception and evaluation which is most significant 
for happiness and satisfaction, but less the objective situation (e.g., 
income) as such.
We could also confirm quite clearly hypothesis 1 stating that life 
satisfaction is more the result of an evaluation of the objective situ­
ation in terms of expectations and comparison processes related to 
objective socioeconomic conditions while high levels of happiness 
may arise only if “positive” factors (mainly close and gratifying social 
relations) are present. From this point of view, the finding that life 
satisfaction is more clearly affected by macrosocial institutional 
conditions (e.g., political freedom, welfare state) than happiness 
makes perfect sense.
We could also confirm hypotheses 2-4: Persons embedded into 
close relationships (the married and persons with children), and 
persons participating actively in social and religious terms are sig­
nificantly more happy than those who find themselves outside of such 
relations or in a state which constitutes a loss in this regard, such as 
divorce or unemployment.
We got quite clear support also for our fifth hypothesis, relating 
happiness to macrosocial structural and institutional characteristics. 
Thus both life satisfaction and happiness are higher in richer coun­
tries and in countries with a more equal distribution of income. Life 
satisfaction is also higher in well-developed welfare states and in 
politically free countries. Thus, we could clearly confirm Raymond 
Boudon’s thesis that the history of social and political institutions is
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guided by the idea to develop institutions and rules which more and 
more respect the dignity of all individuals (Boudon, 2002; Sen, 1999).
One paradox finding seems to be at odds with these conclusions. 
The Latin American countries are characterized by the highest 
degrees of income inequality among all countries in our sample,23 but 
their population is among the happiest around the world. We can 
give three explanations for this finding. First, we have to differentiate 
between the perception of the situation in the personal life context 
and in a society as a whole; satisfaction with the first is much higher 
than satisfaction with the latter (Klages, 1992; Eckersley, 2000; 
Glatzer and Zapf, 1984).24 Second, it is evident that the quality of 
social relations in the Latin American countries must be so high as to 
offset the adverse macrosocial conditions in their countries. We might 
mention here also the finding from the sociology of medicine that 
people differ in their capacities to endure suffering, and to put up with 
privations (Mechanic, 1974: 126); these capacities may decrease with 
increasing wealth and welfare. A third factor explaining the fact that 
high economic inequality did not lower life satisfaction and happiness 
in Latin America may have been the fact that economic development 
of those countries was quite dynamic in the 1990s.
What can be said about further promising lines of research on 
happiness? In this paper, we have followed a quantitative “Durk- 
heimian” approach which has the advantage of showing differences 
between social categories and groups of people, as well as effects of 
the macrosocial level. However, it can grasp the quality of social 
relations only superficially (Scheff, 1990: 22fl). Thus, a further 
promising line of research would be to look more closely into this 
dimension. This could be done in two ways: first, by carrying out in- 
depth studies on the meaning of “life satisfaction” and “happiness” . 
Our thesis that those two concepts cover substantially different 
dimensions has been proved quite clearly. There exist different sets of 
factors which make people quite unhappy in some, but very happy in 
other societies, especially in rather poor countries (such as in Latin 
America). A second promising line of research would be to develop 
standardized scales for an improved measurement of life satisfaction, 
happiness and the quality of social relationships. One would also 
include direct measures of aspirations and expectations which are 
important to explain satisfaction and happiness. The idea of the 
degree to which one’s everyday projects are meaningful, socially
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supported and progressing according to plan (Makinen and Pychy, 
2001) seems particularly promising in this regard.
Such research would be in line with the theoretical argument of a 
dual structure of happiness and mental health. According to this 
theory, happiness is more than just the absence of unhappiness or 
problems; it results only from positive self-concept dimensions and 
life experiences (Haller, 1981; Headey et al., 1984; Argyle, 1987; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Greenspoon and Saklofske, 2001; Vitterso 
and Nielsen, 2002). Such research would also balance the focus of 
present-day social sciences on negative issues and social problems in 
favour of positive factors contributing to growth, development and 
happiness of men and women (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; 
Haybron, 2003). Such a kind of research would be highly relevant 
from the viewpoint of the most advanced societies themselves. Here, 
established habits and life styles have to be changed and new ones 
invented which will be more in line with sustainable societal and 
ecological development for the world as a whole (Schulz, 1995).
As far as differences between nations are concerned, our ap­
proach in this paper was to decompose the effect of “nation” into 
separate, clearly identifyable dimensions. We feel that this ap­
proach has turned out to be quite successful. Yet, we have found 
some instances where significant national differences seemed to 
persist even after controlling for these specific dimensions. This 
suggests that it may well be worth to try to explore also cultural 
differences between nations directly, such as it has been done in 
Hofstede (1984) or Peabody (1985).
Some further important issues concern methodological problems. 
One is the problem of the validity of simple measures of happiness 
and life satisfaction as they have been used in this paper. As we have 
already mentioned, the meaning of happiness may be related to 
culture. In individualistic, competitive societies, it may be an 
expression of success to declare oneself as “happy” (Diener and Suh, 
1997; Diener, 2000: 39). People may not like to appear as unhappy or 
pessimistic about their life because this would be to admit to be a 
loser (Eckersley, 2000: 19). Here, we should develop measures which 
can distinguish between this cultural-normative component of hap­
piness and its substantive meaning.
Another problem concerns the adequate units of analysis at the 
macro level. It is evident that the nation state, which was our unit
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of comparison, is only one among several units that may be rel­
evant here. Among larger and heterogeneous nation states, internal 
regional differences in life conditions and happiness might be 
substantial (see Rampichini and d’Andrea, 1997 for the case of 
Italy). At a lower level, communities, cities or even large organi­
zations might be significant contexts, because at these levels 
important decisions about the quality of the immediate environ­
ment are taken. On the other side, countries with similar social 
structures and cultural and institutional backgrounds form rela­
tively homogeneous “macroregions” (Haller, 1990) which in some 
regards may be treated as “units” . The identification of such 
macroregions could make research easier, since one can select 
fewer cases for in-depth studies and nevertheless be sure to cover 
the whole range of variation in the main variables.
APPENDIX A
TABLE A.I







Women (Ref = men) -0.02** -0.03**
Age -0.07** -0.07**
Education (low-high) 0.03** -0.03**
Decision freedom (low-high) 0.26** 0.41**
Subj. Health (bad-good) -0.40** -0.35**
Basic social relations
Married 0.09** -0.01*
Divorced, separated, widowed -0.16** -0.11**
Single 0.03** 0.03**
No of Children 0.05** 0.06**






N ot employed/ missing -0.05** -0.09**







Professional manual workers -0.05** 0.03**
Manager -0.05** 0.04**
Skilled worker -0.01** 0.01**
Semi skilled worker 0.14** -0.14**
Farmer -0.02** 0.03**
Army -0.01** 0.02**
Never worked -0.05** 0.03**
Income (low-high) 0.08** 0.06**
Financial Satisfaction (low-high) 0.38** 0.65**
Subj. class (high-low) -0.18** -0.19**
No chance esc. poverty (Ref = chance) -0.17** -0.18**










Church Attendance (often-never) -0.12** -0.12**
Voluntary membership (no-many) -0.11** -0.12**
Think about meaning of life (oft-never) -0.01** 0.01*
Others/ own preferences (Ref = other) 0.02** 0.00
Source: World Value Survey 1995-1997, iV(min) = 46339, Significance: **/>^0.01, 
*pi$0.05.
TABLE A.II 










A rgentina 2.85 2.3 51 8030 4.9 65.1 1.90 6.93
A rm enia 3.50 4.4 44 720 -3 .1 - 2.45 4.32
Australia 2.09 1.1 35 19190 3.8 55.9 1.63 7.58












Azerbaijan 4.78 6.6 36 460 -9 .0 37.6 2.12 5.39
Bangladesh 3.79 3.4 34 330 4.8 17.3 1.99 6.41
Belarus 3.70 5.5 22 1870 -4 .3 45.6 2.58 4.35
Brazil 3.46 2.4 60 3690 2.9 40.5 1.97 7.15
Bulgaria 3.56 1.2 28 1370 -2 .7 25.3 2.42 4.66
Chile 2.60 2.2 57 3880 7.2 66.7 1.93 6.92
China 3.78 7.7 40 620 10.7 1.9 1.95 6.83
Colombia 3.10 4.4 57 1880 3.3 45.2 1.70 8.31
C roatia 3.53 4.4 27 3210 -0 .4 61.4 2.25 6.18
Dom inican R. 3.50 4.3 49 1430 5.7 41.6 1.95 7.13
Estonia 2.40 2.2 35 3060 -1 .3 56.0 2.36 5.00
Finland 2.34 1.1 26 20840 2.5 56.6 1.85 7.78
Georgia 3.94 4.5 37 530 -10 .2 26.1 2.31 4.65
G erm any (W) 2.15 1.2 30 27420 1.5 69.8 1.97 7.22
G erm any (E) 2.15 1.2 30 27420 1.5 69.8 2.10 6.64
India 3.93 4.4 38 320 6.1 9.2 1.96 6.53
Japan 2.06 1.2 25 39720 1.4 58.1 1.77 6.61
Latvia 3.24 2.2 32 2340 -4 .8 63.4 2.27 4.90
Lithuania 3.50 1.2 32 1730 -3 .9 50.6 2.44 4.99
M acedonia 3.35 4.3 30 1020 1.9 - 2.26 5.70
Mexico 3.10 4.4 54 3800 2.7 50.2 2.00 7.69
M oldavia 4.10 4.4 34 690 -11 .7 - 2.60 3.73
Nigeria 3.43 7.7 51 210 2.4 - 1.77 6.82
N orw ay 2.39 1.1 26 31490 3.7 49.8 1.76 7.66
Peru 3.59 5.4 46 2320 5.4 27.4 2.09 6.36
Philippines 3.35 2.4 46 1010 3.2 26.0 1.68 6.84
Russia 3.55 3.4 49 2270 -6.1 31.6 2.52 4.41
S-Africa 3.23 1.2 59 3330 1.9 14.7 1.84 6.08
Slovenia 3.74 1.2 27 8300 2.4 70.4 2.15 6.46
Spain 2.54 1.2 33 13670 2.2 49.5 1.91 6.99
Sweden 2.63 1.1 25 24000 1.5 60.5 1.66 7.77
Switzerland 2.60 1.1 33 41370 0.5 71.7 1.66 8.02
Taiwan 2.26 3.3 32 13000 6.5 - 1.86 6.89
Turkey 2.95 5.5 42 2770 4.1 19.0 1.63 6.18
Ukraine 4.05 3.4 33 1350 -10.8 - 2.55 3.95
Uruguay 3.03 2.2 42 5120 3.7 76.1 2.00 7.13












USA 1.99 1.1 41 27410 3.4 53.1 1.60 7.67
Venezuela 3.28 3.3 49 3040 1.9 41.2 1.52 6.72
Sources: Economic Freedom: Miles et al. (2004); Political Freedom: www. free- 
domhouse.org
Gini Index: W orldbank, World development report.
GNP: Fischer, Weltalmanach.
GDP Growth: W orldbank, World development report.
Social Expenditures: W orldbank, W ord development report; own calculation. 
Happiness and Life-satisfaction: World Value Survey 1995-1997.
NOTES
1 In a recent Danish study, Gundelach and Kreimer (2004) found that single, but 
happy people were more likely to be married after 10 years than unhappy singles.
2 The South European countries, for instance, have catched up in the last decades 
in happiness compared to the N orth European countries.
3 Love should not be confused with infatuation; the latter may be more dependent 
on our loneliness (Fromm, 1956; Scheff, 1997: 152f).
4 Zwicky (1982) has shown that increasing inequality does not lead to higher 
perceptions of illegitimacy in a country like Switzerland mainly because of its 
extensive system of direct political participation. However, in other countries this is 
well the case. During the 1950s and 1960s, political unrest in Western Europe was 
clearly related to low levels of development and high levels of inequality (Haller, 
1990: 190).
5 Thanks are expressed to the researchers who have carried out the World Value 
Survey in their respective countries as well as all those -  especially Ronald Inglehart- 
who have contributed to the design of this highly valuable data set. D ata sets have 
been delivered to us by the Central Archive, Cologne (Germany).
6 We tested empirically if the lack of nation-wide sampling in some countries made 
a difference by correlating the scores in the dependent variables “happiness” and 
“ life satisfaction” between the overall samples and the subsamples of city dwellers. 
The correlation coefficients were as high as 0.99, thus indicating that the differences 
are negligible.
7 For Spain, for instance, the survey included separately four provinces (Andalusia, 
Basque country, Galicia, Valencia), for Russia, three subsamples were covered 
(Russia, Moscow, Tambov).
8 In many comparative studies, no clear distinction is made between individual level 
and aggregate relations between variables, interpreting relations at the aggregate level 
(which usually are very high) as if they were individual-level effects (this is true for 
many studies of Inglehart, but also for the study of Veenhoven (1999)).
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9 The determinants of this feeling and its relations to happiness have been explored 
more deeply in a twin paper (Haller and Hadler, 2004).
10 Source: www.worldbank.org/research/growth/pdfiles/GDN/Government Fi- 
nance_6_2001.xls
11 The data are available under www.fredomhouse.org/
12 We also considered some additional indicators for freedom at the societal level. 
We introduced an index of “economic freedom” , developed by the Heritage Foun­
dation (Miles et al., 2004). This index varies from 1.94 (Switzerland) to 4.78 
(Azerbaijan). Highly rated in economic freedom are West-European and Anglo- 
Saxon countries; at the bottom (values over 3.50) we find most less-developed post­
communist countries, China, India, Bangladesh and Peru. Between this index and 
GNP/head, however, exists a rather strong connection and if we introduce it into the 
regression, the effects of either GNP/head or growth of GNP disappear. Thus, we 
decided not to include this additional index for “economic freedom” into the models 
in Table I.
13 We did not find, however, as some other studies (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Hayo 
and Seifert, 2003; Christoph and Noll, 2003) that older people are happier.
14 We tested also the hypothesis of an interaction effect between age and single status 
on happiness. Single persons between about 30 and 50 should be particularly un­
happy since many of them might still hope to get married. Yet, this effect did not 
exist. It seems, therefore, that we must rather speak here of an effect of being married 
as such which leads to higher happiness compared to all non-married persons.
15 This effect turns out, however, only when looking at non-robust standard errors; 
thus, it is less reliable.
16 In a new study on happiness in the European Union, it was found that income 
was the most important determinant (European Foundation, 2004). However, the 
variable used was self-rating on a rich-poor scale, but not factual income.
17 The corresponding distribution of the countries by their mean in life satisfaction 
has been presented in Haller and Hadler (2004).
18 The arabic word al-bait denotes at the same time a family and the family house 
and it indicates also the geneological descent, thus pointing to the central place of 
family relationships for human existence in those societies (Nippa, 1991: 9ff).
19 However, it may not be economic affluence alone, since we know that a high 
GNP/head is associated with many other factors, such as education, social capital, 
trust etc.
20 This finding -  and a comment by a colleague from Brazil -  has led us to the 
hypothesis that there might exist a significant interaction effect between life satis­
faction and ethnic membership in Brazil. The result, however, was negative. Neither 
whites, nor native Americans or blacks were distinguished by consistent and sig­
nificant different levels of happiness.
21 Pearson correlation coefficients are: growth x freedom: 0.62; growth x happiness: 
-0.69; growth x life satisfaction: 0.77.
22 The same is true for the alternative variable of “economic freedom” which 
however, correlates strongly with GNP/head (see footnote 15).
23 Income inequality, as measured by the GINI coefficient, lies between extremely 
high values of 0.45 and 0.60 in the South American countries, but only between 0.20 
and 0.40 in most other countries and regions.
24 In the worldwide Pew Global Attitudes Project, which asked about satisfaction 
with one’s own life, one’s nation and the world as a whole, the percentages satisfied
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